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 Abstract 
The previously neglected phenomenon of governance by committees has recently received 
increasing attention in the academic literature. 
This paper  focuses on the consequences of the arrangements prevailing in the committees 
active in the implementing phase of EU-legislation on the practice of democracy and 
legitimacy. The so-called “comitology committees” can be seen as a good example of the 
tension between input- and output-based sources of legitimacy. On the one hand the EP has 
demanded its increased involvement in this system ever since these committees were 
established. On the other hand ( preliminary) studies have shown that Members of the 
European Parliament seem to be overwhelmed with the scrutiny or even the filing of draft 
implementing measures. This gives rise to the question of increasing the legitimacy of 
committee work and at the same time preserving the “efficiency” of this (presumably) co-
operative form of decision making. 
This phenomenon  is illustrated by means of a case study of committees active in the field of 
health and consumer protection. 
Zusammenfassung 
In den letzten Jahren wurde dem Thema des Ausschusswesens in der Europäischen Union 
(EU) immer stärkere Aufmerksamkeit in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur gewidmet. Dieses 
Working Paper nimmt jene Ausschüsse, die in der Durchführungsphase von EU-Recht aktiv 
sind, unter die Lupe. Diese sogenannten “Komitologie-Ausschüsse” können als gutes 
Beispiel für das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen verschiedenen Formen der “input”- und 
“output” Demokratie betrachtet werden. 
Einerseits hat das Europäische Parlament seine verstärkte Einbindung in dieses System 
moniert, andererseits haben Studien ergeben, dass Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments 
(MdEPs) mit der Prüfung der Entwürfe für Durchführungsrechtsakte überfordert sind.  
In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern die Ausschussarbeit “legitimer” 
gestaltet und gleichzeitig die Effizienz dieser (kooperativen) Form der Entscheidungsfindung 
beibehalten werden könnte. 
Dieses Phänomen wird durch eine Fallstudie über Ausschüsse im Politikfeld des 
Gesundheits- und Konsumentenschutzes illustriert. 
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1. Introduction and scope of the analysis 
The previously neglected phenomenon of governance by committees has recently received 
increasing attention in the academic literature (c.f. Pedler; Schaefer 1996, Van Schendelen 
1998; Christiansen; Kirchner 2000, Rhinhard 2000). In various guises committees are active 
at every stage of the EU-decision making process, reaching from the expert groups of the 
Commission, the working groups of the Council to comitology committees.
1 The increasing 
role committees play within the European arena can be seen as a response to “the need for 
an even higher level of technical expertise, which  stems from the growing complexity of 
regulating contemporary western societies.”
2 
This paper will focus on the consequences of the arrangements prevailing in the committees 
active in the implementing phase of EU-legislation on the practice of democracy and 
legitimacy. It will not dwell on the very complex decision making rules within these so called 
“comitology committees” which, although they have just recently have undergone extensive 
reform, are still a phenomenon that requires its very own science (Weiler et al. 1995, p. 9). 
The tension between ‘input-’ versus ‘output-based’ sources of legitimacy seems, at least at 
first glance, to be manifest in the system of comitology committees: on the  one  hand one 
could argue that the support of citizens could be secured by consensual, efficient outputs of 
these fora. Institutions and procedures have to bring about effective solutions of problems 
(“output-legitimacy”). 
With regard to the input-side, the political system has to be open to citizen participation and 
must enable effective transmission of relevant citizen interests into the process of 
governance. On top of that comes the democratic participation in- and competition over 
inputs; the ability of citizens to chose between rival elites or political agendas  (“input-
legitimacy”) (Hix 1998, Scharpf 1999, Benz 2001). For the EU system this would imply that 
regulators sitting in these committees have to be connected to majoritarian institutions. 
A recent study has shown that the Members of the European Parliament ( MEPs), although 
they have pressed for a greater involvement of the EP into the comitology system, for the 
most part do neither scrutinise nor ‘follow up’ the implementing acts transferred to them by 
the Commission under the various inter-institutional agreements ( EIPA 1998). This gives rise 
                                                 
1
  A comprehensive study on the role of committees within the European system of governance is currently being 
conducted under the Fifth Framework Programme of the European Commission. Research Project “Governance 
by Committee, the role of committees in European policy-making and policy implementation” (Programme: 
Improving Human Potential and Socio-Economic Knowledge Base), Project No. SERD-1999–00128. 
2  
See Technical Annex to the research proposal (submitted under the Fifth Framework Programme of the 
European Commission) “Governance by Committee, the role of committees in European policy-making and 
policy implementation” (Programme: Improving Human Potential and Socio-Economic Knowledge Base, 
Proposal No. SERD-1999–00128).  2 — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — I H S 
 
to the assumption that parliamentary oversight of executive power (at least in the unique set-
up of the EU) meets certain limits in the practical political process.  
The main controversy in what could be described as the “comitology-debate” is the question 
of  the extent to which these committees affect the EC-implementing process and of how and 
by whom they should be supervised and controlled. The perception of the role of these 
committees range from “ one of the most serious democratic defects of this system” (Pedler; 
Schaefer 1996 p. 23) to the impression that these fora deal for the most part with technical 
issues and retain their legitimacy by operating efficiently and through the quality of their 
output (Blumann 1992; Majone 1994). 
Here the question of the separation of powers cannot be neglected completely. Community 
and Union governance “pervert” the balance between executive and legislative organs of the 
national governments and this balance between Commission autonomy and state-
involvement is also apparent in comitology (Weiler et al. 1995, p.7, Marks et al. 1996, p. 
367). 
On the basis of a case study of committees active in the field of health and consumer policy, 
whose decisions can have direct consequences on the European citizen, the paper aims to 
analyse how decisions taken affect the democratic arena.  
In this quest this paper intends on the one hand to examine questions such as the “pros- and 
cons” of increasing the involvement of MEPs within the comitology system and of enhancing 
the transparency of the committees. Closely linked is the question whether the competencies 
of the legislative authorities are deemed to be infringed upon. A special emphasis is put on 
the involvement of the EP in the implementing process, as the EP has put forward extensive 
demands in this context and was ready to resort to drastic measures such as putting in its 
veto in the legislative process when these were not fulfilled. This paper aims to examine 
these demands not only as r egards to their practical feasibility but according to the costs 
involved and their credibility. 
On the other hand, this paper aims to highlight what kinds of decisions are taken in this field, 
by devoting special attention to the question of separating seemingly “routine,” “technical” 
issues from those with political implications.  
Another question up for examination  relates to  how  decisions are taken and whether the 
ideal notion of decision-making within committees, the conception that decisions are taken 
on the basis of a deliberative and consensual nature, is valid within the practical political 
process. Limitations of the system will also be examined. The paper will close by formulating 
recommendations on increasing the legitimacy of these committees. I H S — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — 3 
2. Development of committees 
The genesis of the (in)-famous comitology committees, controlling and assisting the 
Commission in the implementing phase of EU legislation, dates back to the early hours of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). These initial  steps, at the beginning of the 1960s, 
already required extensive and detailed technical regulation. The Council, the then one and 
only legislator, lacked  not only the relevant insight, but also the resources to respond to the 
needs of day-to-day management in this area, which included the ability to take quick action. 
However, it did not wish to delegate the implementation of the acts it adopted to the 
Commission without retaining some form of control.  
Several proposals were put forward as to how this could be accomplished. The rather 
unorthodox compromise that was finally reached provided for the creation of committees 
known as management committees. These were (and still are) comprised of representatives 
of the governments of the Member States  whose task was to issue an opinion on the 
implementing measures proposed by the Commission.  
However, the Commission was still entitled to adopt its proposed measures immediately, 
even if the committee gave a negative opinion by a qualified majority. In the latter case, the 
proposed measures had to be referred back to the Council, which could then take a different 
decision (by qualified majority) within a specified time  – usually one month. This procedure, 
which might seem kind of inconsistent, allowed the  Commission to take particularly urgent 
steps without delay, but at the same time provided the Council with the possibility of 
intervening and modifying the Commission decision. 
Most sectors of the CAP were subsequently established on this basis and the 
implementation of decisions was carried out using a variation of this (only provisional) 
committee procedure in each sector.
3 
As further Community policies outside the agricultural field were established, different 
procedures for their implementation were created. Due to a growing conviction among 
several Member States that the existing procedures allowed the Commission too much 
leeway, the Council’s control over Commission implementing measures was strengthened. In 
1966 the Council debated about which committee procedure should be chosen to implement 
measures in the field of customs, veterinary legislation and legislation on feeding-stuffs and 
foodstuffs.  
                                                 
3
  Before the end of the transition period for which the management committees had actually been established (on 
31 December 1969), the Council decided to maintain the committees on a permanent basis. Management 
committees eventually came to be used for the entire agricultural field. By 1970 there were already 14 such 
committees, and seven years later the number amounted to 18. 4 — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — I H S 
 
As a compromise, the first regulatory committee was created in June 1968. The Commission 
could only implement its proposals if the committee approved them by a qualified majority. If 
this was not the case, it had to submit its proposals to the Council. This procedure 
introduced the provision that the Commission could nevertheless implement its proposals if 
the Council had failed to reach a decision within a certain period of time specified in the act. 
This possibility was called a filet (safety net) procedure. While the Council could agree to this 
type of committee for the area of customs, there was opposition from some Member States 
when it came to veterinary matters and the fields of plant health and feeding stuffs. Here, the 
filet procedure was complemented by the  contrefilet (‘double safety net’) procedure. This 
meant that when the Council could not reach a  positive decision by a qualified majority on 
the proposed measure, it could prevent the Commission from adopting the proposed 
measure by a simple majority.  
The basic procedures for  comitology  committees were established on the basis of this 
compromise. H owever, their quantitative development was neither specified nor were criteria 
laid down with regard to their functioning, efficiency, financing and the type of procedure to 
be chosen in a specific policy field. In the following years, in fact up to the Council’s 
Comitology Decision of 13 July 1987,
4 the Council used (usually slight) variations of these 
committee procedures when it delegated implementation powers to the Commission 
(Demmke, Eberharter, Schaefer, Türk 1996, p. 61f.).
  
It would go beyond the s cope of this paper to provide a detailed analysis of both the 
comitology decision of 1987 and its revised version of 1999.
5 At this point it suffices to say 
that the decision issued subsequently to the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 codified the 
procedures, but led by no means to a simplification. The Council maintained not only the 
three procedures proposed by the Commission,
6 but added two variants to the management 
and regulatory committee procedures. Within the regulatory procedures mechanisms were 
foreseen, which clearly provide the Member States with the most effective control over the 
Commission. Furthermore the Council reiterated its prerogative to reserve implementation 
for itself and inserted restrictive rules governing the conferment of implementing powers in 
the case of safeguard measures. The stipulations foresaw no involvement for the EP.  
The reform of the very complex procedures in 1999 led to a certain amount of streamlining 
insofar as the procedures were reduced to three and the variants  abolished. The EP was 
attributed (limited) controlling powers (see below). 
                                                 
4
  Official Journal (O.J.) 1987, L 197, p. 33. 
5
  For an analysis of the comitology procedures according to the so-called “Comitology Decision of 1987,” see for 
example Pedler; Schaefer (eds.) (1996), pp. 61–82, for an overview see for example: Hix (2000), p. 69. For an 
analysis of the new Comitology Decision of June 1999 see: Haibach (1999). 
6
  Guided by what had been the practice since the 1960s, the Commission proposed three types of committee 
procedure: an advisory committee procedure, the traditional management committee procedure and a 
regulatory committee procedure with a filet. I H S — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — 5 
3. Committees as a problem-solving arena 
This part of the paper will focus on the “positive” aspects characterising committees such as 
their problem-solving capacity and the achievement of consensus.  
Comitology committees have developed based on the principle “necessity is the mother of 
invention,” on an  ad hoc basis. And although they have been the object of much 
(institutional) controversy (see below), they have become an intrinsic feature of the EU 
system of governance.  
The system of comitology committees is only one reaction to growing complexity at all levels 
that challenge the “traditional” institutions of government:  
“The profound differentiation and complexity of modern society is manifested in a number of 
different features that affect governance. The various processes relating to production, 
commerce, health, education, industries, service production etc. are not overseeable. In 
sum, there is great societal complexity. There is administrative complexity; there is technical 
and scientific complexity, complexity of social values and lifestyles. The established, formal 
institutions of government cannot handle this complexity.” (Andersen; Burns 1996, p. 236) 
The actual functioning of committees active in the implementing phase of Community law 
may include actors who are both Member State representatives or have a special interest in 
the policy. The meetings are chaired by Commission officials. 
The results of a survey on the experience of Member State officials in EU committees reflect 
that, out of 218 respondents,  an overwhelming majority were from the Member State 
administrations; 180 respondents
7 were delegated by ministries (Schaefer et al. 2000, p. 29). 
The representatives in these committees deal not only with technical issues such as 
establishing the ecological criteria for the award of the Community Eco-label to single-ended 
light bulbs,
8 but with issues of high political sensitivity such as biotechnology regulation, BSE 
and dioxins. For the most part, however, these committees deal with “routine” matters, – as 
shown by  a study conducted by the European Institute of Public Administration for the EP 
(European Parliament 1999, p. 21). The scrutiny of 204 implementing acts, stemming mainly 
from the environmental sector and the field of economic and monetary affairs, revealed that 
the task of the committees was mainly of a technical nature: for example establishing 
conditions (e.g. for the award of the Community eco-label for laundry detergents) or annexes 
                                                 
7
  The overall sample was composed of Members from the Commission, the Council Working Groups and 
comitology committees. 
8
  European Commission (1993): Document n° XI/200/93 – Rev.1. 6 — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — I H S 
 
were adapted to technical progress (e.g. for cosmetic products). Only two cases were 
identified where an infringement of the competencies of the legislative authorities are 
deemed to have taken place. 
Co-operative forms of d ecision taking have increasingly become manifest in these 
committees where the actors share notions of validity and “a set of normative and principled 
beliefs” (Haas 1992, p. 3). The members of these committees, which are not directly elected, 
have in some instances known each other for years and sometimes meet on a weekly 
basis.
9 This partly enables them to come to a consensus rather quickly. The respective 
figures reflect that only in exceptional instances do some of these comitology committees 
make use of the (legal) possibility of referring a matter to the Council. 
Matters referred to Council 1993–1998 
Opinion of 
Committee
10 
Matter referred to 
Council 
Council opposed 
with SM
11  
Opposition with QM 
or unanimity 
approx. 3000  32  3  8 
European Commission 1998, in: Sauron 1999, p. 52 
This data suggests that the comitology committees could be regarded as a problem-solving 
arena, which is insulated from political pressure. Meeting en camera, secluded from the gaze 
of the public eye, solutions are found within these fora that seem, at least at first glance, to 
bear the virtue of the deliberative and consensual nature of decision making, relying on 
scientific expertise and evidence. They operate based on culture of  output-legitimacy, 
implying that legitimacy can be o btained by generating effective (implementing) legislation 
(Rhinhard 2000, p. 28). Joerges and Neyer characterise comitology committees in the 
foodstuffs sector as generating a “culture of inter-administrative partnership which relies on 
persuasion, argument and discursive process.” (Joerges; Neyer 1997b). 
Giovanni Sartori who focuses in his article “Will Democracy Kill Democracy?” on the decision 
making procedures in committees found that consensual forms of decision-taking prevail 
(Sartori 1975, cit. in T oeller 1998, p. 7). Although in comitology committees majority voting is 
possible, in the vast majority of the cases no majority decision is taken, as indicated by an 
analysis of a sample of implementing measures (European Parliament 1999, p. 25ff.). To 
Sartori, who aims to determine the optimal size of a decision-making body, reducing on the 
                                                 
9
  One example is the management committee for sugar, whose representatives meet once a week. 
10
  These figures only concern the regulatory committees. 
11
  SM: simple majority; QM: qualified majority. I H S — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — 7 
one hand decisional costs and on the other hand external risks, the consensus-orientation of 
committees is a logical consequence of certain qualities characterising a committee: 
a)  The limited number of members of a committee: in comitology committees member 
states usually delegate between up to 1–3 members; 
b)  the fact that these members represent a certain constituency; 
c)  that the committee is a durable and institutionalised group; 
d)  the fact that the committee is usually confronted with a flow of decisions. 
The tendency of committees to decide unanimously is relevant for the question of democracy 
as they aim at reducing the external risks of the individual who has delegated the right to 
decide (Toeller 1998, p. 8). 
A survey on Swedish participants in EU committees also highlights the consensual 
atmosphere prevalent in committees: more than 80 % of the respondents affirm that “a spirit 
of co-operation” characterises group activities to a high degree (Elgström; Jönsson 2000, p. 
689).
12 
An assumption, put forward by Joerges and Neyer, is that national delegates in the 
committees undergo a process of  “Europeanisation,” contributing to a co-operative 
atmosphere and thereby facilitating the achievement of consensus:  
“They slowly move from representatives of the national interest to representatives of a 
Europeanised interadministrative discourse in which mutual learning and understanding of 
each other’s difficulties surrounding the implementation of standards becomes of central 
importance.” (Joerges; Neyer 1997a, p. 291)  
This analysis is, at least at first glance, somewhat questioned by the results of the above 
mentioned survey on the experience of Member state officials in EU committees, which 
reflects that supranational allegiances seem to be secondary to national loyalties: 69 % of 
the respondents delegated to comitology committees answered that they feel allegiance to 
their own government but still a high percentage of officials (44 % ) felt responsible to the 
committee they participated in. Another interesting result in this context is that 81 % of the 
representatives of comitology committees responded that they give much consideration to 
                                                 
12
  In 1998 a questionnaire was distributed to 421 Swedish participants in EU expert groups, working groups and 
comitology committees. The response rate was 65 %. (See: Elgström; Jönsson 2000, pp. 684–704).  8 — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — I H S 
 
proposals and statements from their  own Member State, whereas 57 % answered that they 
would pay much attention to arguments from the Commission (Schaefer et al. 2000).  
Nevertheless one must underline that a clear-cut majority (79 %) expressed trust in the 
Commission as they affirm that it acts independently from national interests. In the same line 
of argument falls the response that 26 % of the members of comitology committees state 
that they have regular contact with Commission officials before participating in committee 
meetings (not only to receive information but also to receive news).  
These findings give rise to the interpretation that although national concerns still play a vital 
role, a certain degree of loyalty to the supranational institutions can not be denied. Sheer 
intergovernmentalism is  transcended insofar as the quality of the argument seems more 
significant than the national affiliation of the respective representative: 69 % of the members 
of comitology committees stated that they would give much consideration to Member States 
who have  demonstrated a certain degree of expertise on the respective subject matter. Only 
30 % of the respondents argued that they would pay much attention to colleagues from large 
Member States (Schaefer et al. 2000, pp. 32–35). 
This goes into the same direction  as the findings of Lewis who observed that members of 
Council Working Parties perform a double role, having a dual personality and as one 
governmental representative claimed, are wearing a  “Janus face.” The representatives share 
a collective rationality based on the dual responsibility to deliver the goods at home and on 
the EU level. They wear  “two hats,” defending national interests and having a responsibility 
vis  à  vis the Community. Before this background, compromise seeking has developed  “into 
an art.” (Lewis 1998, pp. 483–485).  
4. Comitology as a black box 
Despite these positive aspects, reservations remain. This form of oversight, which is 
classified, according to a scheme developed by McCubbins and Schwartz, as  p po ol li ic ce e- -p pa at tr ro ol l   
o ov ve er rs si ig gh ht t, is characterised as the most intrusive and expensive form of oversight 
(McCubbins; Schwartz 1987).  
At first glance the remarkably low rate of committee referrals to the Council seems to 
suggest that the Commission is largely independent in its actions. However, rational 
anticipation of committee action by the Commission may mean that the Commission is 
effectively controlled by the Member States, despite the rarity of sanctions against it. Having 
one’s proposal referred from a committee to the Council can reportedly cast along shadow 
over career prospects as a Commission official. As Pollack points out the story does not stop 
here, however, for two reasons: I H S — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — 9 
The highly complex procedures impose varying requirements on the Commission  – and 
varying thresholds to overruling actions by the committee and the Council. Commission 
discretion is constrained to varying degrees depending on the type of committee procedure 
selected.  
Although the Member States are provided with the most effective control over the 
Commission when installing a committee functioning according to the regulatory committee 
procedures, this presents Member States with a clear trade off between Member State 
control on the one hand, and speed and efficiency of decision-making on the other (Pollack 
1997, p. 115).  
Besides being “intrusive and expensive” a number of other criticisms can be levelled: 
1)  High complexity: the rules are complex, where even committee members are often 
unaware of the respective procedures being used in the committee they are a Member 
of.
13 Rules of procedure are currently an exception, where only an estimated of one 
third of the comitology committees possess such a document;  
2)  lack of transparency: there is a general lack of transparency about the whole process. 
Not only do committees meet b ehind closed doors, but it is difficult to obtain 
information about what decisions are taken and how. Although this varies according to 
sectors, where some progress is made in the field of the CAP for example (see below) 
and the new comitology decision foresees some provisions on transparency, the 
process is still rather opaque. It is curious for example that the EC budget provides the 
most complete list available to public scrutiny of how many committees exist but that 
internal lists of the Commission stipulate different, notably higher, figures (European 
Commission 1997, p. 9); 
3)  lack of accountability: members of the comitology committees are delegated by the 
Member States’ administrations, where it is entirely up to the Member States who is 
delegated to represent their interests. The accountability of the officials is limited 
insofar as there are only directly accountable to their government. Some have argued, 
however, that government by networks as practised by the EU provide  – normatively 
superior  – opportunities for accountability (Joerges; Neyer 1997). Although patterns of 
governance practised (inter alia) in committees may indeed yield higher levels of inter-
elite accountability from which the public may benefit indirectly, the public itself is at 
this  point excluded from any process of deliberation or contestation (Lord 1998). If at 
all, consensus is achieved at an elite level behind closed doors.  
                                                 
13
  Interviews conducted with committee members, EIPA Seminar, September 1998. 10 — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — I H S 
 
5. Comitology as a source for (volatile) conflict 
between the Institutions 
Although the system of comitology seems, at least at a first glance, to be working 
satisfactorily, it is an issue that,  at least in the past,  has also been a volatile source for 
conflict between the EU-institutions. The most adamant critique  has come  from the 
European Parliament (EP) for the following reasons: 
1)  Intransparency   of the committee structure: committees are regarded as a Trojan horse, 
by which national interests are “ carried into” the implementation process of community 
law; 
2)  comitology is seen as a strategy of the Council to circumcise the participation of the EP 
within decisions; 
3)  another fear is that by limiting the decision making powers of the Commission   by way 
of the committees this could undermine the possibility of the EP to hold the EU 
executive accountable (Toeller 1999, p. 342). 
It might be interesting to point out that the EP expressed its opposition to these organs even 
before these committees were formally established, notably in December 1961 (European 
Parliament 1961). Within the course of time the EP has resorted to several instruments to try 
to get across its demands such as blocking part of the budget for committees (for example
14) 
and bringing a charge of annulment before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against the 
comitology decision of 1987.  
Further actions of the EP include an internal organisational reform to enable its committees 
to scrutinise the comitology system with more efficiency, the vetoing of legislation due to 
“inadequate” comitology procedures and the conclusion of inter-institutional agreements 
such as the Plumb-Delors agreement,
15 the modus vivendi of 1994
16 and the Samland-
                                                 
14
  This happened in 1995 and 1998, where the EP blocked 90 % of the budget for committees.  
15
  On the 14. of March 1988 this agreement was concluded with the aim of providing effective information to- and 
the effective consultation of the Parliament. It was established by an exchange of letters between the then 
President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, and the then President of the EP, Henry Plumb, the Commission 
committed itself to forwarding to the Parliament all draft implementing acts at the same time as they were 
forwarded to the implementation committee (European Parliament 1988). 
16
  On 20 December 1994 the Council, the EP and the Commission reached an agreement on a modus vivendi. It 
foresaw that the appropriate committee of the EP be sent, at the same time and under the same conditions as 
the comitology committee, any draft general implementing act submitted by the Commission, together with the 
timetable. This procedure also applied to urgent measures.  
  In cases where measures adopted or envisaged by the Commission were not in accordance with the opinion 
delivered by a comitology committee or where, in the absence of an opinion, the Commission had to submit a 
proposal to the Council, the Commission had to notify the appropriate EP committee. Furthermore if the draft I H S — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — 11 
Williamson agreement.
17 Whereas the first two agreements aimed to provide the EP with 
enhanced information rights as regards to comitology, the Samland-Williamson agreement 
stipulated that MEPs can, under certain circumstances, attend committee meetings.  
The conflict came to an all-time high after the enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) 
where the EP was put on an (almost) equal footing with the Council in the legislative 
process, but the implementing measures remained unchanged. The main demand of the EP 
as that it should be put on the same level with the Council as regards to reviewing, approving 
and vetoing proposed implementation measures. For the practical political process this 
would mean that each time an executive measure, which has been adopted under co-
decision, is referred back to the Council by the respective comitology committee, it should 
also be referred to the EP (European Parliament 1993). The driving force behind this claim 
was that the EP feared that measures decided together with the Council under co-decision 
would then be amended substantially by using the “backdoor” of comitology committees.  
Two notable examples where the EP made use of its veto right were  the proposal on open 
network provisions to voice telephony (ONP)
18 and  the establishment of  a committee in the 
securities sector.
19 In both cases the Council and the EP disagreed on the type of procedure, 
the Council choosing to “tighten” committee p rocedures to provide the Member States with 
the most effective control over the Commission.
20 The EP opposed the Council’s choice as 
the Member States would be given the discretion to make substantial changes to measures 
agreed upon in the legislative process. 
The Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 failed to tackle the issue of comitology, 
postponing yet another “hot” issue. A Declaration relating to the Comitology Decision was 
                                                                                                                                          
general implementing act is referred back to it, the Council could only adopt this act after informing the EP and 
setting a reasonable time limit for obtaining its opinion. In the case of an unfavorable opinion the Council had to 
take “due account of the EP’s point of view” without delay. Additionally, the Commission had to take into 
account, as far as possible, any comments by the EP and keeps the Parliament informed at every stage of the 
procedure (European Parliament 1995). 
17
  This agreement between the Commission (between the then Secretary General of the Commission, David 
Williamson) and the European Parliament (and the then Chair of the EP budget’s committee, Detlev Samland) 
of September 1996 provides for measures regarding transparency in management and regulatory committee 
proceedings. Its main provisions include that: the Commission shall make available to Parliament, “in good time 
in advance of committee discussions, the annotated agendas for each meeting of management and regulatory 
committees”; the Commission shall make available to Parliament the “results of votes in management and 
regulatory committees (votes for and against and abstentions)”; if “Parliament or a parliamentary committee 
wishes to attend the discussion on certain items on the agenda of a committee, the chairman will put the 
request to the committee, which may take a decision; if the committee does not accept the request, the 
chairman must give reasons for the decision; Parliament may wish to publicize such reasons.”  
18
  OJ C 263, 12 October 1992, p. 20–31. 
19
  See OJ L 141, 11 June 1993, p. 1 and OJ L 141, 11 June 1993, p. 27. 
20
  In both cases the Council foresaw a regulatory committee, variant b. In this case the Commission can adopt the 
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merely annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam:
21 “The Conference calls on the Commission to 
submit to the Council by the end of 1998 at the latest a proposal to amend the Council 
decision of 13 July 1987 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission.”  
The EP set out almost immediately to put forward proposals for reform, which were based on 
four main pillars: 
1)  a clearer definition of legislative and executive actions: “general measures” should fall 
exclusively into the realm of the legislature, “substantive provisions” may be legislative 
as well as executive and “implementing provisions” fall exclusively into the scope of the 
executive; 
2)  the EP should be given the possibility of effective control over implementing measures: 
it  should be able to amend or withdraw an implementing measure if delegation 
procedures have been violated or the content of the implementing measure is in fact of 
a legislative nature;  
3)  the simplification of the committee system by abolishing all management and 
regulatory committees; 
4)  “regular and timely” information by the Commission including the composition, the legal 
basis of executive measures, publication of committee minutes and votes, and a 
register of interests of committee members (European Parliament 1998b; Hix 2000, p. 
73f.). 
The Commission complied well in time a s it put forward its proposal already in July 1998, 
where it took almost one year until the Member States could agree on a new regulation.
22 
This new comitology decision of 1999 foresees a certain amount of involvement for the EP 
within the comitology system.
23  
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Involvement of the EP under the new comitology decision 
I)  For implementation of acts which have been adopted according to Art. 251 TEC
24 
a)  The Commission submits draft measures for the implementation of instruments to the 
committees and the EP; 
b)  if the EP finds that draft implementing measures “exceed implementing powers provided 
for in the basic instrument” the EP has to indicate this in a resolution; 
c)  the Commission shall subsequently re-examine the draft measures; 
d)  the Commission shall inform the EP and the committee of the action which it intends to 
take on the EP-resolution and of its reasons for doing so. 
e)  Taking the resolution into account and within the time limits of the procedure under way, 
the Commission may: 
 
1)  submit new draft measures to the committee;  
2)  continue with the procedure; 
3)  or submit a proposal to the EP and the Council on the basis of the Treaty, so that the 
legislative process starts again.  (This was a possibility the Commission had already 
proposed in its proposal for reform of the Comitology decision.) It is rather unlikely, 
however, that Council and EP will resort to this measure, as concessions achieved in the 
legislative process, possibly in conciliation would be declared as void. 
 
 
II)  Involvement of the EP under the regulatory procedure 
If the measures envisaged are not in accordance with the opinion of the committee, or if no 
opinion is delivered, the Commission shall, without delay, submit a proposal relating to the 
measures to be taken to the Council and shall inform the EP. 
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If the EP considers that a proposal submitted by the Commission
25  “exceeds the 
implementing powers provided for by the basic instrument,” it shall inform the Council of its 
position. Under all other procedures the EP indicates its reservations in a resolution.  
The Council may  (not shall, it is up to its own discretion) “where appropriate in view of any 
such position,” act by qualified majority on the proposal
26 (within a period to be laid down in 
each basic instrument but which shall in no case exceed three  months from the date of 
referral to the Council). If the Council indicates by qualified majority that it opposes the 
proposal, Commission must re-examine the document. 
 
 
The Commission then has 3 possibilities: 
1)  can submit its amended proposal to the Council; 
2)  resubmit its proposal; 
3)  or put forward a new legislative proposal on the basis of the Treaty. 
If after the expiry of the specified period the Council has neither adopted the proposed 
implementing act nor indicated its opposition to the proposal for implementing measures, the 
Commission shall adopt the proposed implementing act. This provision of the new procedure 
can be seen as a “fire-alarm” or “early warning procedure,” as it gives the EP the possibility 
of presenting its reservations to the Commission or Council. The legal implications for the EP 
are restricted insofar as the Commission cannot be forced to withdraw its proposal. The 
ultimate decision whether a legal act is  ultra vires  or not  lies with the European Court of 
Justice in the context of the procedure according to Art. 230
27 (where the EP has a privileged 
role) (Haibach 1999, p. 16). 
 
 
The information rights of the EP were improved, as it shall now receive: 
-  agendas of committee meetings; 
-  draft measures submitted to the committees for the implementation of instruments 
adopted under the co-decision procedure; 
-  voting results; 
-  summary minutes of the meetings; and  
-  a register of the organisations delegating the representatives of the Member States. 
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The EP shall also be kept informed whenever the Commission transmits measures or 
proposals for steps to be taken by the Council. Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that the 
new comitology decision foresees that certain provisions on transparency apply to the 
committees. These stipulations include for example that the principles and conditions on 
public access to Commission documents shall be applicable to the committees
28 and that the 
Commission shall publish a list of the committees, which assist her in the exercise of 
implementing powers. 
 
 
An overall evaluation of the implications of the new comitology decision for the EP shows 
that the involvement of the EP boils down to a so called ultra vires control which is to ensure 
that implementing measures do not go beyond the implementing provisions foreseen in the 
basic instrument. Thus, the EP is not placed on an equal footing with the Council. In some 
aspects the decision is not as far-reaching as what has been enshrined in the agreements 
such as the modus vivendi or Samland-Willamson agreement (Haibach 1999, p . 16).
29 
Nevertheless the decision seems to  be met with acceptance by the EP. It indicated at the 
end of May 1999 that it “could accept the compromise solution as in particular the so called 
‘double safety net’ was abolished and the Council will have to decide in future by qualified 
majority to oppose a Commission proposal. The EP also welcomes the fact that under the 
new system it is provided with comprehensive information-rights (General Affairs Council 
1999).  
In a more detailed analysis, the EP states that the new decision on comitology “only partly 
meets the expectations of the European Parliament, but nonetheless constitutes a real step 
forward in comparison with the previous situation.” (European Parliament 2000, p. 5) At this 
point it has to be mentioned that the EP and the Commission have concluded an agreement 
on implementing the new Comitology Decision. Here, after “some difficult debates”,
30 the EP 
accepted that all previous inter-institutional agreements (Plumb-Delors, modus vivendi, 
Samland-Williamson agreement) should be declared as void. The documents that have to be 
referred by the Commission to the EP will be forwarded electronically (once the technical 
arrangements have been made). Each institution will draw up internal administrative 
procedures with a view to provide all the requisite guarantees for forwarding confidential 
documents. 
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Another stipulation narrowing down the provisions of the decision is that when the EP adopts 
a resolution
31 it has to do so in plenary and has one month to comply. In urgent cases (in 
particular on public health grounds) this limit  can  be shortened by the Commission 
(European Parliament 2000, p. 8). 
6. The implications of the involvement of the EP in the 
comitology system for the practical political process 
As illustrated above, ever since the instalment of the first comitology committees, the EP has 
put forward far-reaching demands regarding its involvement in the comitology system. 
Translating them into political science terms, they could be summarised in the following 
manner: 
1)  A clear definition of the boundary between legislative and executive matters, so that 
executive authority would be strictly responsible for implementing measures; 
2)  when implementing acts have been adopted by way of co-decision in the legislative 
process, the EP should be put on an equal footing with the governments of the 
Member States; 
3)  limiting the executive powers of the Member State governments (at least to a certain 
extent); 
4)  the right for the EP to receive (and scrutinise) all draft implementing acts before their 
adoption together with the implementing timetable; 
5)  the right for the EP to veto legislation before it is implemented; 
6)  the meetings of the committees to be held in public. 
Although these demands might seem  justified at first glance,  after closer scrutiny  they 
appear somewhat problematic. First, the line that separates  “routine” implementing 
measures from those with  legislative (and budgetary) implications is rather difficult to draw. 
Of course, it seems fairly logical that the EP as the parliamentary organ of the EU aims to 
limit the scope of executive acts to implementing measures with only minor political 
implications. Apart from the fact that this claim of the EP is based on weak grounds when 
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looking at other political systems,
32 the distinction between political and “non-political” issues 
is not as easy as it seems. Extremely technical and seemingly “routine” issues can involve 
crucial decisions with large political implications touching for example upon questions of an 
ethical and moral nature (as is reflected by the case study below). 
Second, a participation of the EP together with the Council when an issue is referred from a 
comitology committee does not have to be automatic. Of course it seems convincing that 
when Council and EP acted as co-legislator, the EP should also be involved when general 
legislative principles are touched upon or existing acts are amended or updated. The 
comitology decision of 1999 tackles this question insofar as the EP can now, under the 
regulatory procedure,
33 inform the Council of its position, given that the comitology 
committee gave a negative or no opinion. This is of course still well far off from an equal 
footing with the Council. However here we touch again upon the above mentioned issue: 
some measures are purely of an executive nature and the involvement of the EP would be 
superfluous. A system would have to be established within the EP whereby measures with 
legal implications could be distinguished from executive acts without putting too much 
burden on the internal structures of the EP. 
Third, stripping the Member States of their executive powers would be highly problematic as 
in the field of implementation of single market legislation the Member States play a crucial 
role in supporting the Commission. The Commission possesses neither the personal, 
administrative nor financial means to be solely responsible for the implementation of 
legislation. Due to the fact that only 20,032 civil servants
34 work in the European 
Commission, the Commission depends on this network of expertise  for assistance in its 
tasks in the implementation process. By involving the representatives of the Member States 
into this conglomerate, which has been coined as the “Europe of administrations” the 
Commission has furthermore an insight into the positions of the Member States which gives 
it the possibility to facilitate the implementation of legislation as compromises and solutions 
can be found at an early stage. 
Hix argues in this context that the EP should accept that the EU has a “dual executive,” 
which would enable the EP to exert parliamentary oversight (in combination with the 
parliaments of the Member States) over the Commission as well as over the national 
governments (Hix 2000, p. 74–76).  
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Fourth, the demand of the EP to receive and scrutinise all implementing measures would put 
a large financial burden on the EP. The EP itself admits that it is not equipped to scrutinise 
these measures: 
“Neither the European Parliament nor its standing committees is yet adequately equipped to 
scrutinise technical proposals forwarded to expert committees. In particular, it lacks the 
scientific and technical expertise to do so [...]” (European Parliament, 1998b, p. 21).  
If the EP were to analyse, even  though  superficially, each implementing  measure forwarded 
to it by the Commission as regards to whether this measure  “exceeds the implementing 
powers provided for in the basic instrument,” as foreseen by the comitology decision, this 
would imply that this would put a large burden on the personnel and financial resources of 
the EP.
35 Furthermore these resources would at least to some extent be taken from those 
resources substantial for amending and scrutinising legislation.  
The  EIPA study from 1998 (on the impact of European Community implementing measures) 
shows that from approximately 1376
36 measures that the Commission forwarded to the EP 
(according to the modus vivendi) only 204 could be retrieved, where the bulk of these acts 
(114) fell into the sphere of competence of the EP committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer Policy (EIPA 1998). These results give rise to the hypothesis that 
MEPs as ‘representative democrats’ are somewhat overwhelmed even with the scrutiny and 
ex-post control of implementing measures, as even the mere filing of some of the documents 
seems to be a problem. 
Furthermore, issues at stake in comitology committees require a high degree of technical or 
scientific expertise, which MEPs generally do not possess. 
Fifth, the right to veto executive measures before they are implemented is unrealistic, when 
looking at examples such as the US Congress or the German Bundesrat; neither possess 
such a right. From both a practical and political perspective, it is more realistic for 
legislatures to possess the right to challenge executive measures  after they have been 
implemented (Hix 2000, p. 76). 
Sixth, another demand of the EP is that committees should meet in public in order to ensure 
that “problematic items” are publicised. This would be a first step to improving the citizen’s 
possibility for direct interaction with public officials: 
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“If the expert committees have to meet in public, or at least to publish their documentation, 
then pressure groups, lobbies or concerned individuals will be able to bring to Parliament’s 
(and the public’s) attention any problematic items, which can then be dealt with by 
appropriate Parliamentary procedures.” (European Parliament, 1998b, p. 21)  
Here one could argue that if committees met in public on the one hand one could assume 
that these meetings could possibly be rather uninteresting for the “average” citizen, as the 
issues discussed are often of such a technical nature. One the other hand, for matters that 
are indeed of a political nature with (possibly) far reaching implications such as BSE one 
could speculate that these issues would not be discussed in an open forum, but again be 
transferred behind closed doors.  
Case study 
The case, which is to be dwelt on very briefly, is notable as it highlights sensitive issues in 
terms of democracy w ithin the sphere of comitology. As it combines a series of rather 
unusual issues one cannot say, however, that it is of an exemplary nature, but can be used 
to indicate more precisely how the committee system functions. 
In the context of a very topical example, the BSE crisis seems to underpin the allegations of 
the EP that “public health concerns were insufficiently taken into account by comparison with 
the economic imperatives of the single market” (European Parliament 1997). 
The background  is that meat a nd bone meal was produced in the UK using hexane 
processing and heat treatment at 130°. Under circumstances and for reasons, which remain 
somewhat obscure, the British authorities gave the go-ahead for the treatment at a 
significantly lower temperature
37 in 1980. The European Community introduced the first 
directive (90/667/EC) regulating the production of meat-and-bone meal in 1990, stipulating 
that these substances must be treated at a certain temperature.
38 This directive was, 
however, accompanied by questionable derogations.
39 And although the UK banned the use 
of meat-and-bone meal in ruminant feed in Britain, exports of these products continued to be 
permitted. The British Secretary of Health then reported (on the 20
th of March 1996) on a 
study, which established the possible link between BSE and a new form of Creuzfeldt-
Jakobs Disease. 
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As is well known an embargo was decided on 27 March 1996 on the export of gelatine, 
tallow and semen from Great Britain.  This is where the committees came in, as this far-
reaching measure was revoked within a very short period of time. The Commission passed 
its proposal on the lifting of the embargo onto the Standing Veterinary Committee (IIIb-
committee), which could not find a qualified majority in support of the proposal. The 
Agricultural Council, which was convened on the 3
rd of June 1996, could also neither agree 
on an amended version of the proposal, nor could it find a simple majority for vetoing the 
Commission proposal. The Commission was then, according to the stipulations of the so-
called  contrefilet procedure, enabled to adopt the proposal by itself and the embargo could 
subsequently be lifted on 11 June 1996.
40  
This case pinpoints the weakness of the committee procedures.  Although  in the new 
comitology decision, the so-called safety net (whereby the Council could reject the measures 
with simple majority)  has been abolished, the illustrated weakness remains. If the Council 
can neither adopt the implementing act nor can find a qualified majority to indicate its 
opposition,
41 the Commission can adopt the measures. So, the executive can, under certain 
circumstances, decide on measures even if the issue has been referred back to the 
legislator. What is also noteworthy is that the new comitology decision provides for criteria, 
which are to assist the legislator(s) in its/their choice of committee procedure, but are, 
however, of a non-binding nature. These criteria are relevant for our case study insofar as 
they foresee that the regulatory procedure is to be followed as regards to  “measures of 
general scope designed to apply essential provisions of basic instruments, including 
measures concerning the protection of the health or safety of humans, animals or plants 
[...].” This implies that (given these criteria are applied) matters such as the BSE issue would 
also in the future fall under the regulatory procedure. 
According to Claude Blumann and Valerie Adam the BSE crisis illustrates that the 
“procedures do not offer to some states, protecting the temple of comitology, the absolute 
guarantees that they are looking for.”
42 (Blumann; Adam 1997, p. 268) 
The case goes beyond procedural specifities insofar as it also unveiled weaknesses in the 
system of scientific advisory committees. The Scientific Veterinary Committee assisted the 
Commission in its decision to lift the embargo. Being composed of high-ranking scientists in 
the field of veterinary medicine and microbiology, British representatives played a major 
role.
43 The committee had the task to advise the Commission as regards to necessary steps 
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and to provide it with information on scientific and health related issues. This advice, as a 
scientist from the Stuttgart-Hoheheim University stated, was not always of a scientific nature:  
“The veterinarians on the Scientific Veterinary  Committee acted against all standard 
microbiological practices. Their recommendation is incomprehensible and borders on the 
irrational. No housewife would make jam in such disastrous conditions.”  (Agence Europe, 
N°6847, 6 November 1996, p. 13) 
This view is somewhat supported by the then Commissioner Edith Cresson:
44 
“Competition is often perceived as an end in itself. When the embargo on British products 
was decided, I heard the Commissioner for competition declare that this was the end of the 
single market... Then there is the committee of veterinary experts, who represent the 
interests of the Member States. I would like to say that some degree of scientific 
independence prevails, but I have my doubts.” (European Parliament 1997, p. 14) 
The events surrounding the BSE crisis gave rise  inter alia  to the instalment of a 
parliamentary (temporary) Committee on Inquiry on BSE, which led to a complete 
transformation of the system of scientific advisory committees in the Commission. A scientific 
steering committee a s a coordinating body for the many specialised scientific committees 
has been called to life in 1997. The selection of the members of the scientific committees 
was conducted in a way to ensure a high degree of transparency: the call for expressions of 
interest for the post of member of a Scientific Committee was placed on the Internet. Minutes 
and opinions of the scientific steering committee also as regards to the recent developments 
linked to BSE are also scanned in, with the aim of guaranteeing at least a certain amount of 
transparency (http://europa.eu. int/Comm/food/fs/sc/index_en.html). 
7. (Concluding) observations 
Comitology committees can be seen as the “dual-executive” pillars contributing to the 
functioning of the EU’s engine since the beginning of the 1960s. They have become a pivotal 
element in the implementing process of EU legislation, linking the European and the Member 
States level. The members in these committees are on the one hand confronted with having 
to find solutions that are issue-specific and have to be accepted by a majority of the Member 
States and on the other hand have to pay attention not to violate national concerns, as the 
results achieved still have to be met with acceptance “back home.” A survey has shown that 
the representatives in comitology committees have a somewhat split identity: they feel both 
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an allegiance to the Community and to their Member State. In this climate of transcended 
intergovernmentalism a consensus can be found rather quickly and only in exceptional cases 
is a measures transferred to the Council. The abolition of these committees is not only highly 
unrealistic (around 400 such committees
45 exist, with sometimes very detailed portfolios) 
supporting the understaffed Commission in its executive tasks. 
The modus of delegating (unelected) Member State officials and staffing them with far-
reaching controlling powers over the Commission gives rise to questions of democratic 
legitimacy. The EP has pressed for its involvement, even before these committees were 
officially “born.” The conflict was aggravated at the beginning of the 1990s when the EP 
obtained  co-legislative rights with the Council, but the implementing provisions remained 
untouched, foreseeing no involvement for the EP. Before this background the parliamentary 
body was ready to bring the legislative process to a halt, fearing that provisions that were 
agreed in the legislative process would be undermined in the implementing phase, involving 
two levels of bureaucrats: Member State officials and Commission r epresentatives. The EP 
brought forward manifold demands  ranging from the right to veto implementing acts, to 
opening committee meetings to the public and giving the EP extensive scrutiny right over 
executive measures. 
A rather detailed analysis on the impact of European Community implementing measures on 
the EC legislative authorities has shown that the EP’s demand to oversee all implementing 
measures, well before they are enacted, would meet with practical constraints as the EP 
committees have in some cases not even been able to file the measures. Another relevant 
result is the fact that measures dealt with in these committees are in fact of a routine nature. 
A permanent involvement in the EU implementing process would therefore place a great 
burden on the  EPs (limited) financial and personal resources, not to much great avail. A full-
blown involvement of the legislator in the implementing process could not only be seen as 
violating the principle of balance of powers, but would also not meet the interests of EU-
citizens: MEPs would have (even) less time for involvement within the legislative process 
and to strengthen the direct link to the prospective voter by “campaigning” in their “own” 
constituency. 
Only in selected cases such as the (above mentioned) example of BSE are the 
competencies of the legislative authority infringed upon. Even after the reform the comitology 
decision of 1987, the procedures are still codified in such a way that the Commission could 
under certain circumstances adopt a legal act. Closely linked here is another aspect of great 
relevance in this debate of increasing the democratic legitimacy of committees: the 
intransparency and opaqueness of their working methods. 
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It is difficult to convey to the “average” citizen why the Commission should suddenly adopt a 
measure with (possibly) far-reaching implications on the European consumer, such as lifting 
the embargo on the import of certain beef products from Great Britain.  
A first step in closing the gap between the Community on the one hand and the citizens on 
the other would be to increase the transparency of committee work, which leads me to a 
series of suggestions. These are to be seen by no way as exhaustive, but more as a point of 
departure. They go beyond the mere question of increasing the openness of committees by 
trying to tackle the question of enhancing legitimacy of these fora: 
8. Suggestions and... 
1)  Increased transparency: In the quest of increasing the citizen’s possibility to get an 
insight into developments on European level, i.e. those fora “merging” the European 
and national level, the opportunities for involvement, information and scrutiny need to 
be improved substantially.  One step in this direction, which has started to bloom for 
example in the field of agriculture, is to make documents relevant to committee work 
available on the Internet. Not only can fact-sheets be downloaded that outline the 
workings of the different committees, but one will also find short reports on the 
meetings of management and regulatory committees, g iving an overview of the content 
of the matter discussed, whether a vote took place (whether it was favourable or not) 
and which Member States were present and which Commission officials chaired the 
meeting ( http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/minco/index_en.htm).  Nothing speaks 
against opening committees to a (partial) public of “informed experts” or private actors 
(Toeller 1998, p. 9). Opening the committee doors, be it only to a  selected public, 
would send the signal that committees have in fact “nothing to hide.” Currently, acting 
behind an aura of secrecy gives the impression that decisions of high importance are 
taken in these committees, where in fact most of these measures are of a routine 
nature.  In order not to sacrifice efficiency a possibility would be that the “intruders” 
would not attend all committee meetings, but would have to place a request to the 
committee chairman. 
2)  Clear definition of the task of the implementing c ommittee: One way to avoid the 
infringement of competencies of the legislative authorities would be to lay down the 
task of the implementation committee in the legal act. The regulator needs to be aware 
that although the distinction between seemingly technical issues and those with 
political implications is difficult to draw, more general value-related matters should be 
decided upon in the legislative process. For matters falling under co-decision the EP 
could play an active role in shaping this definition. The comitology decision of 1999 24 — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — I H S 
 
picks up on this notion by introducing criteria, trying to limit the choice of committee 
procedures. They are, however, non-binding.  
3)  No general involvement of the EP in the executive process:   As argued in this paper, a 
plethora of reasons speak against a general involvement of the EP in the implementing 
process. However, the EP could resort to limiting the scope of discretion already in the 
legislative process. Another possibility would be for the EP to generate general rules as 
regards to the appointment of committee-members and by increasing the transparency 
of decisions. As Hix points out these observations are confirmed at an empirical level. 
Both in the United States and Germany, constitutional courts have restricted the role of 
the legislature to that of an  a priori delegator and the ex post involvement in the 
adoption of new legislation.  The German  Bundestag  is allowed an ex post veto, but 
only as far as issues of special political sensitivity are concerned and  after e xecutive 
instruments have been enacted. The US Congress has also found that extensive 
oversight over federal agencies is extremely costly, and to rely on private interests to 
challenge decisions can not only be cheaper, but more effective. (Hix 2000, p. 77). 
…Outlook 
The removal of executive powers from the Member States seems highly unlikely and 
undesirable, at least in the near future. Representatives in comitology committees are, as 
experts from the Member States, familiar with the (technical) aspects of a specific issue. 
They function within a culture of  output-legitimacy,  signifying that through their expert 
knowledge they contribute to the EU decision-making process by generating a constant flow 
of (implementing) acts. Assisting and controlling the Commission in the implementation of 
legislation they can be seen as deriving their legitimacy through the quality of their output 
and their efficient operation.  
The general involvement of MEPs as representative democrats, being directly elected by the 
citizens of the EU Member States, in the implementing process would not make the 
implementation of legislation “democratic”  per se. This strategy of increasing the power of 
the EP in the executive process would be flawed as the elections to the EP are at least at 
this point in time “second order national elections” and the principle “one man, one vote” is 
not secured (Hix 1998; Smith 1999). 
The EP should rather concentrate on the legislative process, design rules or means to limit 
the means for  ex post oversight  mechanisms. The provisions of the “new” comitology 
decision of 1999 are based on this notion. They foresee that for draft implementing acts 
adopted under co-decision the EP has the possibility to scrutinise whether the stipulations 
exceed the implementing  powers provided for in the basic instrument. These and other I H S — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — 25 
provisions, providing for example for comprehensive information rights for the EP and more 
transparency within the committee system in general, could bring an end to the power 
struggle between the institutions over comitology.  
The opening up of the committee system to (at least a partial) public and a “wide-ranging, 
highly participatory normative discourse” (Andersen; Burns 1996, p. 246) would be a vital 
next step to enhance the legitimacy of the system and generate public support. 26 — Christine Neuhold / “Much Ado About Nothing?” — I H S 
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